This 
Introduction
This paper makes a distinctive contribution to the academic debates on Brexit and the referendum on UK's continued membership of the EU that occurred in June 2016. The focus of our paper is on the attitudes of Conservative parliamentarians. We have chosen this as our focus for the following reasons. First, the fact that a referendum took place at all was largely a consequence of the demand from within the PCP and their hard Eurosceptic wing (out of fear of the rise of UKIP) who had pressurised Cameron into this (Hardman, 2013) . Second, knowing that the PCP was divided, Cameron decided not to impose an official party position for the referendum campaign (Watt, 2016) . Third, during the course of the campaigning period, with government ministers freed from the traditional burden of collective responsibility, the full scale of Conservative divisions over Europe were exposed. Conservatives berated fellow Conservatives across a wide range of policy issues, and both sides accused each other of lying, hypocrisy and scaremongering (Siesage, 2016) .
Our paper aims to identify, where possible, how each individual Conservative parliamentarian voted in the referendum. We then consider what correlations existed (or did not exist) between those Conservative parliamentarians advocating or rejecting Brexit and 1) social variables such as their age, education -both school and university if applicable -occupation and gender; 2) political variables such as their constituency marginality and whether they were a minister, an exminister or a permanent backbencher; and 3) the ideological variable of morality as encapsulated by the disagreement between social liberals and conservatives over same sex marriage.
Our rationale for asking these questions about social and political background determinants is as follows. First, to see whether the PCP is broadly similar to the electorate as a whole 1 . For example, polling suggested that older voters were more inclined to vote leave, and younger voters are more inclined to vote remain (64% of those 65 and older estimated to have voted for Brexit, with these figures depreciating to 60% for the 50-64 age bracket, and then down to 46% for 25 to 49 year olds, and then only 29% for the under 24s, Moore, 2016) . We also know that the higher the level of educational qualification the greater the likelihood to vote to remain (only 32% of those with a degree estimated to have voted for Brexit, Moore, 2016) . Although the PCP as a whole has a higher level of educational attainment that the electorate, can we identify any relationship between educational background status and remain or leave? We also know that a small gap existed with male voters 47% remain to 53% leave, and female voters 49% remain to 51% leave (Moore, 2016) . Was there also evidence that female Conservative parliamentarians were slightly less Brexit inclined than their male counterparts? Our second reason ties into the fact that we want to embrace and extend the work of Kitzinger (1973) on attitudes within the PCP at the time when the UK joined the then EEC in the Heath era, and Berrington and Hague (1998) who did a similar analysis at the time of the Maastricht rebellions in the Major era. Both Kitzinger and Berrington and Hague examined the interrelationship between attitudes within the PCP and social background variables. What is interesting about their research is the differences that existed across the Heath and Major eras.
Kitzinger identified no discernible trends between Conservatives who were pro-entry and those who were anti in terms of age, university education, constituency majority and ministerial 1 For pre referendum evaluations of public opinion on continued EU membership see Vasilopoulou, 2016. position (Kitzinger, 1973, pp. 401-5) . Berrington and Hague did, however, identify some generational differences, with older Conservative MPs who had been in Parliament for longer (i.e. pre-1979) being more pro-European, and younger Conservatives more likely to be Eurosceptic. Berrington and Hague also identified a correlation between educational background and European attitudes, with those educated at elite private schools and Oxbridge far more likely to be pro-European (Berrington and Hague, 1998, p. 49 ).
Kitzinger concentrated solely on social and political background variables but Berrington and Hague added in an ideological variable. They identified a clear association between Euroscepticism and advocating the restoration of the death penalty and conversely an association between pro-Europeanism and rejection of the death penalty (Berrington and Hague, 1998, p. 56) . We wanted to see if that association between traditionalism and hostility towards Europe still applied. We would not be able to acquire contemporary data on attitudes towards the death penalty -a traditional indicator of social conservatism -so we focused more generally on opposition to the socially liberal aspect of Cameronite Conservatism. This will enable us to see whether socially conservative members of the PCP -those who had opposed Cameron on same sex marriage -also opposed his renegotiated settlement for remaining within the EU.
In structural terms the paper will be broken down into the following sections. The first section will position our paper within the existing body of academic literature on the historical divisions within the PCP and their European policy problem. In doing so it will identify how academics have explained attitudes within the PCP towards European policy over time. We offer this contextual evaluation as a way of understanding the factors that contributed to Cameron being pushed into renegotiating terms of membership and holding an in/out referendum. In section two we construct a set of hypotheses to test in relation to our social, political and ideological variables, and we explain how our dataset on the PCP was constructed. In section three we outline our research findings and then we offer in the final section and analyse their significance.
Strands and Strength of European Opinion within the PCP from Macmillan to Cameron
Our first aim within the paper is to identify the strength of opinion within the PCP vis-à-vis the EU -i.e. how many advocated remain and how many leave. However, before we do so it is important to situate those strands of opinion -i.e. the reforming but remain strand and the rejectionist Brexit strand -within their historical context. By doing so we recognise that the crystallisation of these strands of opinion is part of a complex and evolving process. That is because engagement within Europe has been a fluid rather than a static process and the strategic questions raised have changed over time. For example, whether to join the Common Market in the 1960s and whether they should exit in the 1975 referendum; whether to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the 1980s and 1990s, and ultimately through to the repatriation, renegotiation and referendum debates of the Cameron era. As the questions have changed so attitudes have hardened, and the Conservatives' approach has evolved from 'pragmatic pro-Europeanism' to 'pragmatic Euroscepticism' 2 (Smith, 2015, p. 371).
Strands of European Opinion 1961-2005
The labels for Conservative MPs as pro-European or Eurosceptic -which dominated discussions in the Major era -are not the only distinctions used to capture the divisions within the party over time. Those with doubts were labelled as anti-Marketeers in the 1960s and 1970s (as opposed to pro-Europeans or pro Marketeers), before the label of Euroscepticism gained traction in the late 1980s (as opposed to Europhiles), whilst Euroscepticism, (i.e. opposition to European institutional authority and their objective of Euro-federalism), has been subdivided in soft and hard variants in the last decade (Lynch, 2015) . There is some continuity in the underlying assumptions explaining pro-Europeanism or Euroscepticism across the decades. For those of a pro-European persuasion it was clear that a con-federalist position of advocating inter-governmental co-operation to accrue economic benefits and to secure greater power and influence was pragmatic and sensible politics (indeed, a small minority of ardent pro-Europeanist Heathite Conservatives could even endorse a Euro-federalist vision) (Crowson, 2007, pp. 105-26 (Fontana and Parsons, 2015, p. 90) . Moreover, the sceptical wing held doubts about the wisdom of surrendering sovereignty to a supranational body of which they would have no control (Garry, 1995, p. 172 (Fontana and Parsons, 2015, pp. 89-105) . This was hugely significant as prior to this Euroscepticism had traditionally been the preserve of the backbenchers of the PCP and those willing to rebel (Crowson, 2007, p. 153) . Pragmatic engagement tended to be the preserve of the frontbench. Indeed through her signing of the SEA she had acquiesced to the integrationist process. The integrationist path was continued by the decision to join the ERM in 1990 (which resulted in a humiliating withdrawal in 1992) and the ratification of the Treaty of European Union in the Major era 4 (notwithstanding the opt-out that Major secured on the single currency).
Strength of European Opinion 1961-2005
The Thatcher era coincided with the end of the 'heyday' of pro-Europeanism (Crowson, 2007, p. 109 (Crowson, 2007, p. 165) . A decade later 40
Conservatives' rebelled in Parliament, and an estimated further 75 who were said to have reservations, whilst the pro-European 'Conservative Group for Europe' was said to have the backing of approximately 200 Conservative parliamentarians from a 330 strong PCP (Crowson, 2007, p. 124, 164) . By the onset of the Thatcher era (1975 to 1990) the con-federalist positioni.e. pragmatic pro-Europeanism -was the mainstream position within the PCP (Crowson, 2007, pp. 40-45) . A small minority of PCP members could consider embracing a federalist agenda, and at the other extreme there was small grouping of implacable anti-Marketeers, whom Ashford described as 'irrelevant' in terms of their influence within the PCP, in part due to the outcome of the 1975 Referendum (Ashford, 1980, p. 110-12) .
4 The Heath and Major governments would be defined by legislature trench warfare over respectively the European Communities Act of 1972 and the Treaty of European Union of 1993. Norton would chart the surge in parliamentary rebellion rates during the Heath Government of 1970 to 1974 (hitting an 18.5% rebellion rate as compared to the 1.4 rebellion rate in the 1951 to 1955 Parliament) as nearly forty Conservative backbenchers defied the whip (Norton, 1978 ; see also Lord, 1994) . When the Major government sought parliamentary consent during the passage of the Treaty of European Union in 1992-3, a total of fifty Conservative MPs rebelled (15% of the PCP), (see Cowley and Norton, 1999) , which was part of a protracted period of confrontation between the Conservative Whips' Office and Eurosceptic Conservative backbenchers (see also Alderman, 1996; Baker, Gamble and Ludlam, 1993 , 1994 , Ludlam, 1996 .
Euroscepticism would grow as a force within the PCP between 1992 and 2005. This was largely attributable to the negative impact of their humiliating expulsion from the ERM in September 1992 which undermined the Europhile argument and legitimised Euroscepticism (Gifford, 2008, p. 123 divisions. This was ironic as they were unable to exploit the fact that public opinion at the time was closer to their position than that of the more pro-European New Labour (Evans, 1998 ; see also Evans and Butt 2007; Clements, 2010; and Stevens, 2012) . 
Strands and Strength of European Opinion: 2005-
When Cameron assumed the party leadership he felt that the Conservatives obsession with
Europe was counter-productive. His modernising plans involved downplaying Europe as an issue. In a clear attempt to transcend Thatcherism, Cameron used his early years in opposition to emphasise the themes of environmentalism, feminisation, international aid, poverty and social justice, as opposed to known Conservative themes such as taxation, immigration and Europe (Bale, 2010, pp. 283-362) .
However, his strategy of lowering the saliency of Europe and avoiding conflict with his backbenchers and confrontation within the EU would unravel once he became Prime Minister.
Scepticism within the PCP escalated as the perceived threats associated with EU membership intensified. Threat one was the 'sovereignty' threat caused the integrationist and expansionist mentality of the EU. This threat was longstanding but the three emerging threats explained the growth of Euroscepticism within the PCP. Threat two -the 'economic' threat -would flow from the perceived failings of the EU as evidenced by the Eurozone crisis, which acted as vindication in the minds of sceptics and justified their decade plus long argument about the folly of joining the single currency (Lynch, 2015) . Threat three -the 'identity threat' -emerged as a consequence of the rising salience of immigration in terms of voter concern. This was aligned to concerns about economic security as East European workers became readily blamed both for the unemployment and low wages of British workers, and for the over-burdening of already oversstretched public services in an era of spending cuts (for a critique of these assumptions, see Lemos and Portes, 2013) . This became inextricably to threat four -the 'electoral' threat from UKIP as a populist party representing 'the people' against the EU (Gifford, 2014) . That rise included a surge in UKIP membership and strong performances in opinion polls, local elections, and the 2014 European elections and in the 2015 General Election (see Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015) The ability of Cameron to manage how the PCP reacted to these threats was compromised by the fact that he was not entirely trusted by many of the Thatcherite Eurosceptic wing of the party. That distrust was fuelled by three factors. First, because Cameron reneged (in 2009) on his prior pledge to hold a referendum on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, and thereby convinced of the need to constantly pressurise Cameron vis-à-vis policy towards the EU (see Lynch and Whittaker, 2013) . Second, their doubts about Cameron's willingness for policy compromise were intensified by the formation of a coalition with the pro-European Liberal
Democrats (see Quinn, Bara and Bartle, 2011) . Finally, these hard Eurosceptics had never been convinced of the case for downplaying of immigration and Euroscepticism, and Cameron's failure to win the General Election of 2010 outright, solidified their belief that much of the UKIP vote was from disaffected Conservatives 6 (Dorey, 2010, p. 432) .
That distrust reflected the Eurosceptic concern that Cameron was too relaxed about the increasing threats associated with membership of an unreformed EU. The consequence was that Euroscepticism was to become more embedded under Cameron's leadership than before, and would morph into harder and softer variants of scepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008, pp. 247-8) . Indeed, even by the time the Conservatives re-entered government in 2010 it was clear that evaluating the European cleavage within British Conservatism via the labels of Europhilia and Euroscepticism was no longer credible (Cowley and Stuart, 2010, p. 141) . This was in part due to the erosion of pro-European sentiment within the PCP -estimated at only seven members (or 2.3 %) of the 306 strong PCP of 2010-15 (Heppell, 2013, p. 350) . However, the main reason why it was no longer credible was because the label Eurosceptic had ceased to capture the pragmatic form of Euroscepticism advanced by Cameron and the more dogmatic Euroscepticism being expressed on the backbenchers (Heppell, 2013, p. 344) . The soft variant accepted the principle of continued membership but opposed any further integrationist objectives. Soft Euroscepticism captured the Cameron 'revisionist' mind-set which implied renegotiated terms would justify continued membership, whereas hard Eurosceptics were developing a 'rejectionist' mind-set (Flood, 2009 (Heppell, 2013, p. 347) .
Faced with a significantly more Eurosceptic PCP than had previously been the case, Cameron sought to placate backbench sentiment, and nullify the threat from UKIP, by announcing in 2013 that a future Conservative Government would renegotiate a new settlement within the EU, and that this would lead to an in-out referendum (Copsey and Haughton, 2014) . That Cameron was pressurised into seeking a renegotiation and then a referendum that would dominate and disfigure political debate was somewhat ironic, after all his strategy upon becoming Conservative Party leader had been to reduce the saliency of Europe. During the General Election campaign of 2015 the Conservatives ran on a European policy platform of reform, renegotiation and referendum, arguing that Labour and the Liberal Democrats would deny voters this option, and that only they and not UKIP could deliver on this (Conservative Party, 2015, pp. 72-3) .
hold a referendum on whether the UK should remain in the EU as currently configured, or renegotiate, or withdraw (Lynch and Whittaker, 2013, pp. 317-9 ; see also Cowley and Stuart, 2012) . During the course of the 2010 to 2015 Parliament a total of 103 Conservative parliamentarians out of 306 rebelled at least once on a parliamentary division about Europe (covering a total of 49 different divisions) (Lynch, 2015, p. 193) .
Thereafter, running parallel to the parliamentary passage of the European Union Referendum
Act the process of negotiation between the British Government and the EU culminated in a package of reforms that would take effect once a vote for remain was confirmed in the forthcoming referendum (Grice, 2015) . Cameron announced on February 20 th that the Referendum would take place on June 23 rd , and confirmed that although the position of the Government was to remain, he would suspend collective ministerial responsibility thus allowing ministers to campaign to leave the EU (Quinn and Phipps, 2016) . In a bitter and unpleasant campaign the Conservative parliamentarians displayed a level of mutual antipathy reminiscent of the Major years.
Hypotheses and Data Collection
We constructed our hypotheses around two considerations. First, as was mentioned in our introduction (page two) we wanted to see whether social variables of age, education, occupation and gender were the same within the PCP and they were within the electorate as a whole.
Second, we also wanted to replicate, if possible, assumptions that had been made in the earlier studies of Kitzinger (1973) and Hague and Berrington (1998) , to see whether their findings still applied a generation later. We therefore constructed the following eight hypotheses: Our ability to test these assumptions requires that we construct a reliable dataset on the PCP.
Explaining the methods by which we constructed the dataset is therefore essential. One of our background social variables -that of gender -was straightforward, but the other background social variables, plus the political and ideological variables require elaboration. With respect to the background social variables of age, school, University education, and occupation plus the background political variables of constituency marginality, and whether they had held ministerial office or not, were all acquired from, first, the UK Parliament website section profiling each individual MP (see http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/mps/); and, second, individual constituency websites of each Conservative.
7 We thought that constituency marginality could be an influence upon the attitudes of Conservative parliamentarians due to the threat from UKIP. They increased their vote share from 3.1 to 12.6 % between the General Elections of 2010 and 2015. Although the peculiarities of the first past the post voting system meant that this translated into only one seat, UKIP increased the number of second place finishes from zero to 120 constituencies, and 74 of these were Conservative constituencies (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015) . Thus, we assumed that the threat from UKIP might act as an incentive for Conservatives holding the more marginal constituencies to advocate Brexit to nullify the appeal of UKIP.
8 We assumed that a correlation might exist between being an incumbent minister and voting remain (this would explain why Cameron selected them for ministerial office); and that exministers and backbenchers would show a greater propensity towards Brexit (see Heppell, 2013) . 9 We assumed that a Brexit advocates would be more likely to be social conservatives (i.e. opponents of same sex marriage and the social liberalism of Cameron) (on the socially liberalsocially conservative divide within the PCP, see Heppell, 2002 and . We made this assumption because Berrington and Hague (1998) had identified a correlation between social conservatism and Euroscepticism in the Major era, and we wanted to see whether socially conservative members of the PCP -those who had opposed Cameron on same sex marriagealso opposed his renegotiated settlement for remaining within the EU. Our coding in terms of background political variables worked in the following ways. In terms of marginality from the 2015 General Election we differentiated members via the following:
<1,001; 1,001 to 5,000; 5,001 to 10,000; 10,001 to 20,000; and then 20,001+. For the ministerial variable, we coded by three distinctions: first, being a minister at the time of the referendum;
second, having been a minister in the past; and, third, never having been a minister at all. On issues to do with social morality we coded by updating the findings of Heppell from the 2010 to 2015 PCP -based on noting the moral attitudes of each Conservative MPs from their voting behaviour and statements in Hansard (predominantly on the same sex marriage legislation); their signatories to morality based EDM's; their statements on their constituency webpages; and by examining public comments via radio and television interviews (Heppell, 2013: 344-5) .
Research Findings
Our research objectives were two fold -first, to identify the strands (remain or leave) and the numeric strength of opinion within the PCP and to locate those findings within the recent historical development of the PCP; and second, to relate that opinion to our social, political and ideological assumptions.
Research Aim One: Identifying Strands and Strength of Opinion within the PCP 2016
Our findings in relation to the balance of opinion within the PCP vis-à-vis remain or leave are presented in 
Research Aim 2: Identifying Social, Political and Ideological Determinants of Referendum Positioning within the PCP
In table three we provide the data from the 2015-PCP with regard to our social variables -i.e.
position on the referendum in relation to age, school, University, occupation and gender; our political variables -i.e. position on the Referendum in relation to constituency marginality, and whether they were a minister, an ex-minister or a permanent backbencher; and our ideological variable on attitudes towards morality or more specifically same sex marriage. In table four we present our outputs for the multivariate logistic regression model, which shows the effect of our independent variables on support for voting in the referendum. Indeed, this is the only relationship which is significant at the p=0.000 level -between how one voted on same sex marriage and how one voted in the referendum. Relative to those who voted for same sex marriage, those who voted against have 0.28 times the odds of voting leave. This confirms our final hypothesis.
Analysis and Conclusions
Our paper makes an original and distinctive contribution to the academic literature on the European Referendum of June 2016 by addressing the two research aims that we set ourselvesi.e. first, to determine the exact strength of opinion within the PCP in the referendum; and second, to identify whether any associations could be identified in terms of attitudes within the PCP and a range of social, political and ideological variables.
On the first research aim our findings help us to see how closely aligned thinking within the PCP was to the electorate as whole. Voting patterns within the PCP deviated from the electorate at large in the sense that the majority of the PCP wanted to remain within the EU -174 (52.7%) PCP members voted remain, as opposed to 145 (43.9%) voted to leave, with a small number of Conservative parliamentarians (11 or 3.4%) not declaring publicly how they voted. The PCP was more out of kilter with known Conservative voters -61% of 2015 Conservative voters voted for Brexit and only 39% for remain (Moore, 2016 ).
On our second research aim the social variables that we focused in on have enabled us to confirm that there was some similarity between the PCP and the electorate. For example, with regard to educational background status and attainment, notably in terms of University education, Oxbridge graduating Conservative parliamentarians showed a trend towards remain, whereas non undergraduate Conservative parliamentarians showed a slant towards Brexit.
However, this association has to be qualified by acknowledging that only 32% of graduates voted for Brexit. The fact that gender did not distinguish Brexit Conservatives from remain Conservatives was also replicated within the electorate as a whole. However, whereas these relationships were not as pronounced within the PCP as they were within the electorate -e.g. 64% of over 65s voted Brexit, whereas Brexit amongst male voters was 53% but it was slightly lower at 51% amongst female voters (Moore, 2016) .
Our second research aim also allowed us to consider a range of political variables and from these our findings revealed the following. On constituency marginality no significant pattern could be identified, yet ministerial status did have a skewing effect upon attitudes towards Brexit. The reluctance of ministers to advocate Brexit could be attributed to either a genuine conviction about the dangers of Brexit; or that Cameron deliberately avoided selecting as ministers too many hard Eurosceptics. Or it might suggest some degree of career management by incumbent ministers -i.e. advocating Brexit when their current leader was advocating remain might smack of disloyalty (even without the whip being applied), or that they expected remain to win the referendum and they feared advocating Brexit might result in ministerial dismissal in a postministerial reshuffle.
Our findings did indicate that there was a wider ideological dimension within the PCP to advocating Brexit in that social conservatives were more likely to advocate Brexit than social liberals. In an earlier academic assessment of the ideological disposition of the PCP in the 2010-15 Parliament, Heppell had identified that 50 members (16%) were both hard Eurosceptics and social conservatives. These were the so-called 'implacable critics of Cameron' who found him too pragmatic on European matters and an anathema to them due to his advocacy of same sex marriage (Heppell, 2013, p. 346-50) . That grouping, who had also largely been overlooked in terms of ministerial preferment, formed the base of anti-Cameronite sentiment within the PCP.
Our research confirms that this anti-Cameronite socially conservative and Euro-rejectionist grouping had increased from 50 or 16% of the 2010 to 2015 PCP, to 82 or 25% in the 2015-PCP.
These research findings make a significant and distinctive contribution to academic debates on Brexit and the referendum. Those findings are useful in terms of our understanding of the Conservative Party and their European policy problem. Not only do they help scholars to understand how the strands of opinion have been reconfigured in the last few decades, but they chart the numeric strength of opinion within the PCP -from Eurosceptic, to hard Eurosceptic, to Euro rejectionist -from the Major era to the Cameron era. They are also useful in a historical comparative sense. That is because around the time of UK entry into the Common Market, Kitzinger conducted research on the PCP in an attempt to identify variables that may explain being anti and pro Common Market. From this Kitzinger identified no discernible trends between Conservatives who were pro-entry and those who were anti in terms of age, university education, constituency majority and ministerial position (Kitzinger, 1973, pp. 401-5) . At the time of deciding to exit the EU, our findings showed that education did matter (lower status Universities or none were more inclined to towards Brexit) and that backbenchers were more inclined towards Brexit. In this sense our findings contradict some of Kitzinger social and political background findings from the time of entry into the Common Market. Our ideological finding can also be aligned to prior academic work on the PCP as Berrington and Hague (1998, p. 56 ) identified a clear association between Euroscepticism and social conservatism in the Major era. Our findings reaffirmed that association: 82 out of 330 of the PCP being both social conservative opponents of same sex marriage and membership of the EU.
Choosing the option of a referendum showcased how traditional methods of party management used by previous Conservative party leaders -trying to buy off potential rebels with ministerial 23 | P a g e office, hard line discipline or permitting low level dissent, policy compromise or deferring decisions -had not solved their European policy conundrum (Lynch and Whittaker, 2013) . That left Cameron will only two other party management options according to Lynch and Whittaker: option one -reduce the saliency of Europe, or option two -circumvent internal dissenters by securing an endorsement for the leadership position from the electorate via a referendum.
Cameron was willing (reluctantly) to take the second option of a referendum because attempting to reduce the saliency of the EU could not work due to the pressure of UKIP and critics on his own backbenchers, and because he was a risk taking politician -think, for example, of coalition formation and the AV Referendum, and the Scottish Referendum (Alexandre-Collier, 2015).
Cameron underestimated the extent of Brexit sentiment that existed within the electorate as a whole and the credibility of the 'remain' campaign was undermined by the strength of Brexit advocates within the PCP. The Guardian, 5 th January.
